The Botswana has 40% of GDP from diamonds, is a country and the climate is mainly tropical, all of which might be taken to make Botswana curse of sensitive resources. However, it actually supports the highest growth rate per capita in the world in the last 35 years (Acemoglu et al, 2002).
Acemoglu et al. suggest that the economic success of the strength of national institutions that have declared the rights of protected areasInvestors provided that political stability and forces the elite in a strong political system and ensuring the political participation of a broad cross section of society. Acemoglu et al. argue that the strength of institutions can not be explained with reference to Botswana, the country's history. Botswana supported traditional tribal institutions that ensure broad participation and the maintenance of the elites, the Botswana Branch of the British Empire meant that tribal structuresnot completely erased by the colonial structures.
E 'possible to Botswana, a country with traditional institutions capable of overcoming the resource curse, could oppose with Somalia, where traditional institutions are not sufficient to maintain political stability (Acemoglu et al. 2002).
Again, the British colonial government had a limited effect on the structure of Somali society. Although its economy is dominated by agriculture, and therefore not under the curse of resources such asBotswana shows the impact on the economy, weak institutions, one might assume that the situation in Somalia would be even worse if you have an abundance of natural resources. Ransacked the industrial sector of Somalia, based on the processing of agricultural products, and most of it was sold as scrap metal, has no effective government, national and conflict is common (CIA Factbook). Clapham writes (1986), that the traditionally nomadic Somali society became available, with more intensive analysisResources. These pre-existing basis of the Somali tribal society is not a sufficient basis for the government, which may occur in the allocation of resources, without ethnic and cultural conflicts.
Collier (2007) used in Nigeria as an example of the benefits of institutions of checks and balances on the distribution of resource rents. Nigeria is undoubtedly cursed with an abundance of resources. Oil provides 95% of its revenue in foreign currency since independence in 1960, ismilitary and civilian rule has strong ethnic and religious tensions, and the recent elections have been plagued by violence (CIA Factbook). Is not this an example of what can happen if all conditions are good, but it highlights the benefits of institutional development.
In 1998, Nigeria returned to civilian government, the first term of the new government, where massive corruption, checks and balances do not exist, because it has had time to establish and powerful interests wereagainst them. Publicly funded projects planned to acquire opportunities for individuals from the electricity and donations for electoral support. But strengthening the start of his second term as president institutions to perform basic checks and balances, as for example tenders for public projects, public tenders were called and put out the call costs were reduced an average of 40%. This shows the improvement made with the can be strengthenedInstitutions.
• Acemoglu, D. Johnson, S., Robinson, J. (2002), An African Success Story: Botswana CEPR Discussion Paper. • Clapham, C. (1986) The Horn of Africa, Peter Duignan and Robert H. Jackson, eds. Politics and Government in African States 1960-1985, Croon Helm, London. • Collier, P. (2007) The Bottom Billion: Why poor countries are not, and what you can do, Oxford, Oxford University Press
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